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Effects of market structure and patient choice on hospital quality for planned patients
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The potential for payment reform to influence emergency admissions
the case of blended payment in the English NHS -
Financial incentives and prescribing behaviour in primary care
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Paying for health gains
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Health insurance system fragmentation and COVID-19 mortality
evidence from in Peru -
The role of payment reform in influencing Accident and Emergency Department attendances
variation across Clinical Commissioning Groups -
Spatial competition and quality
evidence from the English family doctor market -
Spatial competition and quality
evidence from the English family doctor market -
Does hospital competition improve efficiency?
the effect of the patient choice reform in England -
Quality incentives under a capitation regime
the role of patient expectation -
Payment reform, purchaser and provider decisions and the performance of emergency healthcare systems
the case of blended payment in the English NHS -
Medical pricing decisions
evidence from Australian specialists -
Does efficient deterrence require that the wealth should be able to buy justice?
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Optimal deterrence with legal defence expenditure
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Quality incentives in a regulated market with imperfect information and switching costs
capitation in general practice -
Income, income equality and health
what can we learn from aggregate data -
Waiting times and waiting lists
a model of the market for elective surgery -
Managing demand in primary care
the market for night visits -
Measuring performance in primary care
econometric analysis and dea -
Does quality affect patients' choice of doctor?
evidence from the UK -
Does quality affect patients’ choice of doctor?
evidence from the UK -
Does a hospital’s quality depend on the quality of other hospitals?
a spatial econometrics approach to investigating hospital quality competition -
Does quality affect patients’ choice of doctor?
evidence from the UK -
Imperfect quality information in a quality-competitive hospital market
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Imperfect quality information in a quality-competitive hospital market