This paper assesses wage setting and wage dynamics in a search and matching framework where (i) workers and firms on occasion meet multilaterally; (ii) workers can recall previous encounters with firms; and (iii) firms cannot commit to future wages...
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ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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This paper assesses wage setting and wage dynamics in a search and matching framework where (i) workers and firms on occasion meet multilaterally; (ii) workers can recall previous encounters with firms; and (iii) firms cannot commit to future wages and workers cannot commit to not searching on the job. The resulting progression of wages (from firms paying just enough to keep their workers) yields a compensation structure consistent with well established but difficult to reconcile observations on pay dynamics within jobs at firms. Along with wage tenure effects, serial correlation in wage changes and wage growth are negatively correlated with initial wages.
