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  1. Market for information and selling mechanisms
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zürich

    A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 590
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that maximizes the willingness to pay of firms for information. Different selling mechanisms are compared: list prices, sequential bargaining, and auctions. The intermediary optimally sells information through auctions, whereas consumer surplus is maximized with sequential bargaining and list prices. We discuss the regulatory implications of our results.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/251741
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 22, 367 (February 2022)
    Schlagworte: Selling mechanisms; Market for information; Data intermediaries; Competition policy; Regulation of digital markets
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten)
  2. Competition between strategic data intermediaries with implications for merger policy
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zürich

    We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 590
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes with other intermediaries on a common group of consumers. Information allows firms to distinguish different segments of the consumer demand, and an equilibrium has the following properties. (i.) The largest intermediary collects the highest number of segments and sells information in the competitive market. (ii.) The incentives of the largest intermediary to collect data increase with the competitive pressure exerted by smaller intermediaries through an escape-competition effect. (iii.) Intermediaries sell information on a larger group of consumers in the competitive market than in the monopoly markets, increasing the intensity of competition among firms. (iv.) Competition reduces the incentives of intermediaries to collect data, thus increasing consumer surplus. These results have important implications for merger policy. Indeed, mergers increase the amount of data collected by intermediaries, which reduces consumer surplus due to enhanced price discrimination. This effect takes place in the market where the merging intermediaries operate, and also in other related markets through a ripple effect.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283361
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 23, 383 (April 2023)
    Schlagworte: Competition; Data intermediaries; Data collection; Selling strategies
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten), Illustrationen