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  1. Competition and mergers with strategic data intermediaries
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: October 2021
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We analyze competition between data intermediaries collecting information on consumers, which they sell to firms for price discrimination purposes. We show that competition between data intermediaries benefits consumers by increasing competition... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    We analyze competition between data intermediaries collecting information on consumers, which they sell to firms for price discrimination purposes. We show that competition between data intermediaries benefits consumers by increasing competition between firms, and by reducing the amount of consumer data collected. We argue that merger policy guidelines should investigate the effect of the data strategies of large intermediaries on competition and consumer surplus in related markets.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/245520
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9339 (2021)
    Schlagworte: data; mergers; competition; consumer surplus
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Market for information and selling mechanisms
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: [2022]
    Verlag:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zürich

    A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that... mehr

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    DS 590
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    A monopolist data intermediary collects consumer information that it strategically sells to competing firms in a product market for price discrimination purposes. The intermediary charges a price of information and chooses the optimal partition that maximizes the willingness to pay of firms for information. Different selling mechanisms are compared: list prices, sequential bargaining, and auctions. The intermediary optimally sells information through auctions, whereas consumer surplus is maximized with sequential bargaining and list prices. We discuss the regulatory implications of our results.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/251741
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 22, 367 (February 2022)
    Schlagworte: Selling mechanisms; Market for information; Data intermediaries; Competition policy; Regulation of digital markets
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten)
  3. The sale of data
    learning synergies before M&As
    Autor*in: Legros, Patrick; Dubus, Antoine
    Erschienen: 23 June 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17404
    Schlagworte: synergies; mergers; sale of data; incomplete information; Antitrust; privacy
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten)
  4. Market for information and selling mechanisms
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: May 2020
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We investigate the strategies of a data intermediary selling consumer information to firms for price discrimination purpose. We analyze how the mechanism through which the data intermediary sells information influences how much consumer information she... mehr

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    We investigate the strategies of a data intermediary selling consumer information to firms for price discrimination purpose. We analyze how the mechanism through which the data intermediary sells information influences how much consumer information she will collect and sell to firms, and how it impacts consumer surplus. We consider three selling mechanisms tailored to sell consumer information: take it or leave it, sequential bargaining, and auctions. We show that the more information the intermediary collects, the lower consumer surplus. Consumer information collection is minimized, and consumer surplus maximized under the take it or leave it mechanism, which is the least profitable mechanism for the intermediary. We discuss two regulatory tools – a data minimization principle and a price cap – that can be used by data protection agencies and competition authorities to limit consumer information collection, increase consumer surplus, and ensure a fair access to information to firms.

     
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/219125
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 8307 (2020)
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten)
  5. The sale of data
    learning synergies before M&As
    Autor*in: Dubus, Antoine; Legros, Patrick
    Erschienen: June 2022
    Verlag:  ECARES, Brussels, Belgium

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/344835
    Schriftenreihe: ECARES working paper ; 2022, 20
    Schlagworte: synergies; mergers; sale of data; incomplete information; antitrust; privacy
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten)
  6. Determinants of mobile broadband use in developing economies
    evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa
    Autor*in: Hasbi, Maude; Dubus, Antoine
    Erschienen: 2019
    Verlag:  International Telecommunications Society, Helsinki

    Broadband is seen as a vector of economic growth and social development. In the developing world, mobile technologies are widely adopted and mobile broadband is progressively rolled-out with high expectations on its impact on the countries'... mehr

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    Broadband is seen as a vector of economic growth and social development. In the developing world, mobile technologies are widely adopted and mobile broadband is progressively rolled-out with high expectations on its impact on the countries' development. We highlight what the determinants of mobile broadband use are in four Sub-Saharan countries. Using micro-level data coming from household surveys over 5 years, from 2013 to 2017, we show that the ownership of a mobile phone is highly correlated with mobile broadband use. We also show that for non-mobile owners, the ownership of an active SIM card is a prerequisite for using mobile broadband. In addition, mobile money users tend to be more likely to use mobile broadband. This could highlight the existence of a learning effect. By using mobile money services, individuals gain more experience and are more inclined to use more advanced technologies, such as mobile broadband. Although we show that mobile broadband use is increasingly growing, a large part of the population, mainly composed of poor households living in rural areas, is still left behind. This raises concerns on the increase of the digital gap between people and territories.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/205180
    Schriftenreihe: Towards a connected and automated society : 30th European Conference of the International Telecommunications Society, Helsinki Espoo - Finland, 16th - 19th June 2019
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Market for information and selling mechanisms
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: April 2020
    Verlag:  ECARES, Brussels, Belgium

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Schriftenreihe: ECARES working paper ; 2020, 07
    Schlagworte: Daten; Verbraucher; Verkauf; Vermittlungstätigkeit; Preisdifferenzierung; Mechanismus-Design-Theorie; Konsumentenrente; Theorie
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten)
  8. The strategic value of data sharing in interdependent markets
    Autor*in: Bhargava, Hemant; Dubus, Antoine; Ronayne, David; Shekhar, Shiva
    Erschienen: February 2024
    Verlag:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as... mehr

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    Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which data collected via consumer usage in each market is a factor of product quality in both markets. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create co-dependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a co-opetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the intruder a stakeholder in the valuable data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist's continued success. Moreover, while the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from the weaker price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big tech firms.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/296052
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working papers ; 10963 (2024)
    Schlagworte: data-driven quality improvements; externalities; co-opetition; data sharing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. The strategic value of data sharing in interdependent markets
    Autor*in: Bhargava, Hemant; Dubus, Antoine; Ronayne, David; Shekhar, Shiva
    Erschienen: [2024]
    Verlag:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as... mehr

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    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 553
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    Large, generalist, technology firms-so-called "big-tech" firms-powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding tech generalist. We do so by developing a model of crossmarket competition in which data collected via consumer usage in each market is a factor of product quality in both markets. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create co-dependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a co-opetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the intruder a stakeholder in the valuable data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist's continued success. Moreover, while the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from the weaker price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big tech firms.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/289828
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 498 (February 17, 2024)
    Schlagworte: data-driven quality improvements; externalities; co-opetition; data sharing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Selling strategic information in digital competitive markets
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: 2018
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich

    This paper investigates the strategies of a data broker in selling information to one or to two competing firms that can price-discriminate consumers. The data broker can strategically choose any segment of the consumer demand (information structure)... mehr

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63 (7078)
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    This paper investigates the strategies of a data broker in selling information to one or to two competing firms that can price-discriminate consumers. The data broker can strategically choose any segment of the consumer demand (information structure) to sell to firms that implement third-degree price-discrimination. We show that the equilibrium profits of the data broker are maximized when (1) information identifies the consumers with the highest willingness to pay; (2) consumers with a low willingness to pay remain unidentified; (3) the data broker sells two symmetrical information structures. The data broker therefore strategically sells partial information on consumers in order to soften competition between firms. Extending the baseline model, we prove that these results hold under first-degree price-discrimination.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/180340
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; no. 7078
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Competition between strategic data intermediaries with implications for merger policy
    Autor*in: Bounie, David; Dubus, Antoine; Waelbroeck, Patrick
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zürich

    We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes... mehr

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    DS 590
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    We build a model of competition between strategic data intermediaries collecting consumer information that they sell to firms competing in a product market. Each intermediary has access to exclusive information on a group of consumers and competes with other intermediaries on a common group of consumers. Information allows firms to distinguish different segments of the consumer demand, and an equilibrium has the following properties. (i.) The largest intermediary collects the highest number of segments and sells information in the competitive market. (ii.) The incentives of the largest intermediary to collect data increase with the competitive pressure exerted by smaller intermediaries through an escape-competition effect. (iii.) Intermediaries sell information on a larger group of consumers in the competitive market than in the monopoly markets, increasing the intensity of competition among firms. (iv.) Competition reduces the incentives of intermediaries to collect data, thus increasing consumer surplus. These results have important implications for merger policy. Indeed, mergers increase the amount of data collected by intermediaries, which reduces consumer surplus due to enhanced price discrimination. This effect takes place in the market where the merging intermediaries operate, and also in other related markets through a ripple effect.

     
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    Sprache: Englisch
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    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283361
    Schriftenreihe: Working paper / CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich ; 23, 383 (April 2023)
    Schlagworte: Competition; Data intermediaries; Data collection; Selling strategies
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 77 Seiten), Illustrationen