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  1. The inner workings of a hub-and-spoke cartel in the automotive fuel industry
    Autor*in: Chaves, Daniel; Duarte, Marco
    Erschienen: 2021
    Verlag:  Department of Economics, Social Science Centre, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada

    We analyze a hub-and-spoke cartel in the Brazilian automotive fuel industry. Using the court documents and detailed data on the supply chain we uncover three mechanisms beyond information sharing used by wholesalers (hub) to help retailers (spokes)... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 235
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We analyze a hub-and-spoke cartel in the Brazilian automotive fuel industry. Using the court documents and detailed data on the supply chain we uncover three mechanisms beyond information sharing used by wholesalers (hub) to help retailers (spokes) solve the obstacles of price coordination: vertical transfers across asymmetric spokes; subsidies during punishment; and cost stabilization. We argue that wholesalers benefited from the cartel by being the exclusive supplier during the scheme. We use the synthetic control approach to quantify how successful the cartel was in increasing markups. We find that not only retailers, but wholesalers benefited from the cartel.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261277
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Economics research report series ; # 2021, 6 (December 2021)
    Schlagworte: Antitrust; Hub-and-Spoke Collusion; Vertical Restraints
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Multi-product pricing and minimum resale price maintenance
    Autor*in: Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
    Erschienen: December 2020
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    We provide a novel explanation for why manufacturers want to enforce a minimum resale price (min RPM) on retailers. A manufacturer sells her good via a multi-product retailer to final consumers by charging a linear wholesale price. The manufacturer... mehr

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We provide a novel explanation for why manufacturers want to enforce a minimum resale price (min RPM) on retailers. A manufacturer sells her good via a multi-product retailer to final consumers by charging a linear wholesale price. The manufacturer then maximizes her profit through min RPM whenever the Edgeworth taxation paradox (ETP) occurs, that is, whenever the retailer could increase profits by decreasing all prices. Unlike many other justifications for RPM, our ETP-driven explanation for min RPM critically relies on interbrand competition, and it is-at least in the case of linear demand functions-always to the detriment of consumers.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242338
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 20
    Schlagworte: Resale Price Maintenance; Vertical Restraints; Retailing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
  3. Resale price maintenance in a successive monopoly model
    Autor*in: Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
    Erschienen: February 2023
    Verlag:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 256
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a substitute good and/or the effort the retailer exerts for service provision or advertising. Our explanation for a min RPM is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications for a min RPM that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on-as we show-why a min RPM is implemented: if the goal is to soften competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if the goal is to secure service provision, it tends to benefit consumers.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783863043940
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/268656
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 395
    Schlagworte: Resale Price Maintenance; Vertical Restraints; Cost Pass-Through; Retailing
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten)
  4. Resale price maintenance in a successive monopoly model
    Autor*in: Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian
    Erschienen: February 2023
    Verlag:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a... mehr

    Standort:
    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Düsseldorf
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    We present a model to explain why a manufacturer may impose a minimum resale price (min RPM) in a successive monopoly setting. Our argument relies on the retailer having non-contractible choice variables, which could represent the price of a substitute good and/or the effort the retailer exerts for service provision or advertising. Our explanation for a min RPM is empirically distinguishable from alternative justifications for a min RPM that rely, for instance, on retailer competition and service free riding among retailers. Whether a min RPM benefits or harms consumers depends on-as we show-why a min RPM is implemented: if the goal is to soften competition with the substitute product, it tends to harm consumers, and if the goal is to secure service provision, it tends to benefit consumers

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 395
    Schlagworte: Resale Price Maintenance; Vertical Restraints; Cost Pass-Through; Retailing
    Umfang: 38, 9 Seiten