Verlag:
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
We take a decentralized approach to regulating environmental pollution in settings where each agent's pollution possibly affects all others. There is no central agency to enforce pollution abatement or coordinate monetary transfers. Moreover, agents...
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ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
Signatur:
DS 432
Fernleihe:
keine Fernleihe
We take a decentralized approach to regulating environmental pollution in settings where each agent's pollution possibly affects all others. There is no central agency to enforce pollution abatement or coordinate monetary transfers. Moreover, agents possess private information, which precludes deducing efficient abatement in general. We propose to implement transfer schemes through smart contracts to allow beneficiaries to compensate for abatement. We characterize all schemes that induce efficient abatement in unique dominant-strategy equilibrium. Moreover, appealing to classical fairness tenets, we pin down the "beneficiaries-compensates principle". Supporting this principle through smart contracts provides a promising step towards decentralized coordination on environmental issues.
