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  1. Coordination and Incumbency Advantage in Multi-Party Systems - Evidence from French Elections
    Autor*in: Dano, Kevin; Ferlenga, Francesco; Galasso, Vincenzo; Le Pennec-Çaldichoury, Caroline; Pons, Vincent
    Erschienen: October 2022
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    In theory, free and fair elections can improve the selection of politicians and incentivize them to exert effort. In practice, incumbency advantage and coordination issues may lead to the (re)election of bad politicians. We ask whether these two... mehr

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    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    keine Fernleihe

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    keine Fernleihe

     

    In theory, free and fair elections can improve the selection of politicians and incentivize them to exert effort. In practice, incumbency advantage and coordination issues may lead to the (re)election of bad politicians. We ask whether these two forces compound each other. Using a regression discontinuity design in French two-round local and parliamentary elections, we find that winning an election increases candidates' chances to win the next election by 25.1 percentage points. Close winners are more likely to run again and more likely to win, conditional on running, than close losers. Incumbents personalize their campaign communication more and face fewer ideologically close competitors, indicating that parties coordinate more effectively on the winning side than on the losing side. A complementary RDD reveals that marginally qualifying for the runoff also enables candidates to rally new voters, but does not affect the number of competitors on their side. We conclude that party coordination and voters rallying candidates who won or gained visibility in an election both contribute to their success in future races, even absent any actual difference in quality with candidates on the losing side

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w30541
    Schlagworte: Politiker; Wahl; Wahlverhalten; Frankreich; Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; Election Law
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  2. Coordination and incumbency advantage in multi-party systems
    evidence from French elections
    Autor*in: Galasso, Vincenzo; Dano, Kevin; Ferlenga, Francesco; Le Pennec-Çaldichoury, Caroline; Pons, Vincent
    Erschienen: 24 October 2022
    Verlag:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; DP17600
    Schlagworte: Politiker; Wahl; Wahlverhalten; Frankreich; Incumbency advantage
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 89 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Identification in a Binary Choice Panel Data Model with a Predetermined Covariate
    Autor*in: Bonhomme, Stéphane; Dano, Kevin; Graham, Bryan S.
    Erschienen: March 2023
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ,... mehr

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ, whereas the distribution of unit-specific heterogeneity, as well as the feedback process that maps lagged outcomes into future covariate realizations, are left unrestricted. We provide a simple condition under which θ is never point-identified, no matter the number of time periods available. This condition is satisfied in most models, including the logit one. We also characterize the identified set of θ and show how to compute it using linear programming techniques. While θ is not generally point-identified, its identified set is informative in the examples we analyze numerically, suggesting that meaningful learning about θ is possible even in short panels with feedback

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w31027
    Schlagworte: Panel; Schätztheorie; Logit-Modell; Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  4. Identification in a binary choice panel data model with a predetermined covariate
    Autor*in: Bonhomme, Stéphane; Dano, Kevin; Graham, Bryan S.
    Erschienen: 2023
    Verlag:  Cemmap, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Department of Economics, UCL, [London]

    We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ,... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 243
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ, whereas the distribution of unit-specific heterogeneity, as well as the feedback process that maps lagged outcomes into future covariate realizations, are left unrestricted. We provide a simple condition under which θ is never point-identified, no matter the number of time periods available. This condition is satisfied in most models, including the logit one. We also characterize the identified set of θ and show how to compute it using linear programming techniques. While θ is not generally point-identified, its identified set is informative in the examples we analyze numerically, suggesting that meaningful learning about θ is possible even in short panels with feedback.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/272837
    Schriftenreihe: Cemmap working paper ; CWP23, 01
    Schlagworte: Panel; Schätztheorie; Logit-Modell; Sequential Moment Conditions; Feedback; Panel Data; Incidental Parameters; Partial Identification
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten)
  5. Identification in a binary choice panel data model with a predetermined covariate
    Autor*in: Bonhomme, Stéphane; Dano, Kevin; Graham, Bryan S.
    Erschienen: [2023]
    Verlag:  Cemmap, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Department of Economics, UCL, [London]

    We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ,... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 243
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We study identification in a binary choice panel data model with a single predetermined binary covariate (i.e., a covariate sequentially exogenous conditional on lagged outcomes and covariates). The choice model is indexed by a scalar parameter θ, whereas the distribution of unit-specific heterogeneity, as well as the feedback process that maps lagged outcomes into future covariate realizations, are left unrestricted. We provide a simple condition under which θ is never point-identified, no matter the number of time periods available. This condition is satisfied in most models, including the logit one. We also characterize the identified set of θ and show how to compute it using linear programming techniques. While θ is not generally point-identified, its identified set is informative in the examples we analyze numerically, suggesting that meaningful learning about θ may be possible even in short panels with feedback. As a complement, we report calculations of identified sets for an average partial effect, and find informative sets in this case as well.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/284141
    Schriftenreihe: Cemmap working paper ; CWP23, 17
    Schlagworte: Panel; Schätztheorie; Logit-Modell; Feedback; Panel Data; Incidental Parameters; Partial Identification
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen